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and companies of the United States, can reject foreign judgments when 
evidence exists that the judgment was influenced by corrupt forces. 178 
Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
supports this conclusion by stipulating that if a foreign court fails to be 
fair or impartial, the United States court is not bound to follow it. 179 
Here, FBJ produced evidence of impropriety on the part of the Russian 
courts. Several documents detailed a meeting between the deputy 
chairman of the Russian Federation and a representative from the 
Arbitrazh where the litigation between SMS and FSUESMS, as well as 
the need to protect state interests, were addressed. 180 The documents 
demonstrated improper influence and justified the United States court's 
decision not to defer to the Russian judgment. 
F. Holding of the Court 
The Court denied Berov's motion for reconsideration, basing its 
determination on the flawed logic of the court and viable allegations of 
judicial misconduct. 181 
G. Conclusion 
In declining to defer to the Arbitrazh' s decision and 
acknowledging the political corruption of the Arbitrazh, the Court 
highlighted the paramount importance of United States business 
interests and the judiciary's protectionist role in international law. In 
addition, by refusing to defer to the Russian decision, the Court made a 
political point and demonstrated its intolerance for judicial corruption. 
P. Carey Kulp 
VI. NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT 
United States of America v. Schultz 
A. Introduction 
In United States of America v. Schultz, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit examined whether conspiring to take 
178. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 207. 
179. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b 
(1987)). 
180. Id. at 208. 
181. Id. at 216. 
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antiquities that were owned by the Government of Egypt under 
Egyptian Law 117 violates the National Stolen Property Act [hereinafter 
NSPA]. 182 In analyzing this issue, the Second Circuit analyzed the law 
of Egypt- Law 117, the meaning of the term stolen, and the Fifth 
Circuit's definition of the NSP A. 183 The Second Circuit found in this 
case that the Egyptian antiquities were stolen within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 2315, NSPA. 184 To support this finding, the Second Circuit 
stated that property stolen from a foreign government that has 
ownership of the propertrs under valid patrimony law is considered 
stolen under the NSP A. 85 The Second Circuit has not properly 
reviewed the NSP A prior, so in analyzing this case, they applied NSPA 
law from other circuits. 186 
B. Parties 
The plaintiff in this case is the United States of America. 187 The 
defendant, Frederick Schultz [hereinafter Schultz] was a successful art 
dealer in New York City. 188 Schultz was indicted on "one count of 
conspiring to receive stolen" Egyptian antiquities "that had been 
transported in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371" and 18 U.S.C. § 2315, NSPA. 189 
C. Facts 
In 1991, Schultz met Jonathan Parry, a British national, who 
showed Schultz a photograph of ancient Egyptian sculptures.190 One 
particular sculpture, the head of Pharaoh Amenhotep III, interested 
Schultz, they devised a plan to get this sculpture to the United States for 
Schultz to sell in his art gallery. 191 In order to sell the head, Schultz and 
Parry invented a fictional collection called the "Thomas Alcock 
Collection" and eventually sold the sculpture to Robin Symes" 
[hereinafter Symes] for $1,200,000. 192 Three years later, Symes learned 
that the Egyptian government was pursuing the sculpture, and asked 
182. United States of America v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2003). 
183. Id. at 401. 
184. Id. at 399. 
185. Id. at 416. 
186. Id. at 404. 
187. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 393. 
188. Id. at 395. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 396. 
191. Id. 
192. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396. 
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Schultz to offer more information as to the origins of the artwork. 193 
Schultz failed to provide any additional information to Symes. 194 
Parry and Schultz became partners, and together smuggled and 
sold approximately six items under the alias the Thomas Alcock 
Collection. 195 Parry was eventually caught by the British officials, but 
was able to free himself by bribing corrupt members of the Egyptian 
antiquities' police to erase his name from all records. 196 Then, Parry 
smuggled three more items out of Egypt and sent them to Schultz.197 
Parry was arrested again in 1994 in Great Britain for dealing in 
stolen antiquities. 198 Although Parry had been taken into custody in 
Britain, he continued to have dealings with Schultz to obtain the three 
Egyptian limestone slabs.199 The communication and letters exchanged 
between Schultz and Parry had always indicated that they were aware of 
the great legal risk they were taking.200 This awareness was shown in 
the content of the letters and in code or even languages other than 
English. 201 
D. Discussion 
The Second Circuit notes that issues or foreign law are questions of 
law.202 Therefore, in the analysis of Egypt Law 117 of 1983, the court 
reviews this law de novo. 203 The standard of review in this case is for 
plain error because Schultz did not object to the charge at trial.204 "To 
establish plain error, a court must find l) an error, 2) that it is plain, 3) 
that affects substantial rights. "205 "If the error meets these three 
considerations then the court considers whether or not to exercise its 
discretion to correct the error. "206 









202. Id. at 401; FED.R.CRIM.P. 26.1 (2003)(citing parallel rule FED.R.Clv.P. 44.1). 
203. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 401. 
204. Id. at 413, citing United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94 (2d.cir. 2000); see also 
FED.R.C1v.P. 56 (b). 
205. Id. at 413, citing United States v. Kague, 318 F.3d 437, 441- 42 (2d. Cir. 2003). 
206. Id. at 413. 
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i. Egypt's Law 117 
Egypt's Law 117-enacted in 1983 and entitled "The Law on the 
Protection of Antiquities"-declared all antiquities discovered after the 
enactment of the statute to be property of the Egyptian government.207 
The statute requires all privately owned antiquities prior to 1983 to be 
registered with the Egyptian government, and prohibits the removal of 
any registered items from Egypt. 208 Thus the law states, in the sanctions 
section of the law, "that a person who unlawfully smuggles an antiquity 
outside the Republic or participates in such an act shall be liable to a 
prison term with hard labor and a fine of not less than 5,000 and not 
more than 50,000 pounds."209 
Schultz states Law 117 does not apply because it is not within the 
policy of the United States "to enforce the export restrictions of foreign 
nations."210 The Second Circuit responded to this argument by finding 
that Schultz offered no evidence on support of this assertion and even if 
his assertions proved to be accurate, the outcome of this case will still 
not differ.211 Furthermore in analyzing Law 117, the Second Circuit 
stated that the law not an export- restriction law, it is an ownership 
law.212 This "law is used in Egypt to prosecute people for trafficking in 
antiquities within Egypt's borders."21 Although smuggling antiquities 
within Egypt is different than smuggling them out of Egypt, they are 
both prohibited under Law 117.214 
ii. Application of the definition of "stolen " to the NSP A 
The Second Circuit also analyzed in this case as to whether the 
NSPA applies to cases in which an object was stolen in violation of the 
patrimony laws, differs from an object that are stolen in the familiar use 
of the word.215 In looking at the meaning of stolen in this case, the 
Second Circuit looked to the Supreme Court definition found in United 
States v. Turley since no definition had been adopted in that circuit 
under the NSPA.216 Turley stated that the term "stolen" has no accepted 
207. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398. 
208. Id. at 399. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 407. 
211. Id. 
212. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 407. 
213. Id. at 393. 
214. Id. at 409. 
215. Id. at 398-99. 
216. Id. at 409 (citing United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957)). 
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common law meaning.217 Furthermore, the Second Circuit accepted 
from Turley that the NSP A covers a broader class of crimes than those 
contemplated by common law.218 Thus, the Second Circuit stated that 
goods that belong to a person or entity without consent are "stolen" in 
every sense of the word.219 Schultz's actions violated the NSPA 
because the antiquities he received were not given consent for Schultz 
to take them. 220 The entity to give "consent" in this case is the nation of 
Egypt.221 
iii. United States v. McClain analysis in the Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit has rarely addressed the NSP A, so for the 
purposes of this case they looked at the Fifth Circuit's views.222 In 
United States v. McClain [hereinafter McClain], the Fifth Circuit was 
one of the only federal appeals court to have addressed whether the 
NSPA applies to stolen property under foreign patrimony Law.223 
The defendants in McClain were convicted for violating the NSP A 
for importing Mexican artifacts. 224 The Fifth Circuit decided that the 
objects were "stolen" within the terms of the NSP A and they stated: 
This conclusion is a result of our attempt to reconcile the doctrine 
of strict construction of criminal statutes with the broad significance 
attached to the word "stolen" in the NSP A. Were the word to be so 
narrowly construed as to exclude coverage, for example, with respect to 
pre-Columbian artifacts illegally exported from Mexico after the 
effective date of the 1972 [patrimony] law, the Mexican government 
would be denied protection of the [NSP A] after it had done all it 
reasonably could do [to vest] itself with ownership to protect its 
interests in the artifacts. This would violate the apparent objective of 
Congress: the protection of owners of stolen property. If, on the other 
hand, an object were considered "stolen" merely because it was illegally 
exported, the meaning of the term "stolen" would be stretched beyond 
its conventional meaning. Although "stealing" is not a term of art, it is 
also not a word bereft of meaning. It should not be expanded at the 
government's will beyond the connotation depriving an owner of its 
217. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409 (citing United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957)). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 409. 
220. Id. at 407. 
221. Id .. 
222. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 403. 
223. Id. at 404. 
224. Id. at 403. 
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rights in property conventionally called to mind. 225 
The Second Circuit has never decided whether the holding of 
McClain should be the law in the Second Circuit. 226 In this case, the 
Second Circuit rejected the McClain analysis because the facts in 
McClain and this case were too distinguishable.227 
F. Holding of the Court 
The Second Circuit concluded in this case that the "NSP A applies 
to property that is stolen from a foreign government, where that 
government asserts actual ownership of the property pursuant to a valid 
patrimony law."228 They found Schultz's other claims to have no 
merit. 229 Thus, the findings of the lower court that convicted Schultz in 
United States District court for the Southern District of New York is 
affirmed. 230 The lower court further found that Schultz violated 18 
U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring "to receive stolen property that had been 
transported in interstate and foreign commerce."231 Schultz was 
sentenced to a term of thirty-three months of imprisonment. 232 
G. Conclusion 
In this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit interpreted the NSP A and how it applied to foreign patrimony 
law.233 Although many circuits have analyzed the NSPA, the relevant 
act for stolen foreign goods, the Second Circuit has rarely looked at 
these laws. 234 In looking at this statute, the Second Circuit 
contemplated Egypt's Law 117, the definition of the term stolen, and 
Fifth Circuit's analysis of the NSPA.235 In looking at these factors, the 
Second circuit decided that Egypt's Law 117, does apply to the NSPA 
because Egypt's law is clear; the Egyptian government wants to have 
absolute ownership of all antiquities found after 1983. 236 Furthermore, 
the Second Circuit decided that the term stolen does not have a common 





230. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 404. 
231. Id. at 395. 
232. Id. at 398. 
233. Id. at 393. 
234. Id. at 404. 
235. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 416. 
236. Id. at 400. 
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law meanin~ and thus is not in violation of foreign patrimony law and 
the NSPA.2 7 Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's 
analysis of the NSP A, because they stated that the facts in the Fifth 
Circuit McClain case are distinguishable from this case.238 
Pooja Sethi 
VII. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
Wang v. Ashcroft 
A. Introduction 
In Mu-Xing Wang v. John Ashcroft, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit announced that they had not set forth a 
test as to how the Board of Immigration Appeals should apply the facts 
to the relevant law in habeas review petitions.239 A specific test was not 
outlined, because the court decided that the Board of Immigration 
Appeals [hereinafter BIA] applied the facts properly to the law in 
Wang's Convention Against Torture claim. 24° Furthermore, on the due 
process claim, in looking at whether Wang has been denied his due 
process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the Second Circuit analyzed this claim as one of 
substantive rather than procedural due process. 241 This analysis varies 
from how the lower court analyzed the claim; however, the Second 
Circuit still denied that there has been a violation of Wang's due 
process rights. 242 
B. Parties 
The plaintiff, Mu-Xing Wang [hereinafter Wang], a thirty- one 
year old Chinese immigrant, entered the United States without being 
lawfully admitted.243 The Superior Court of New Haven Connecticut 
convicted Wang of robbery and unlawful restraint and sentenced him to 
ten years imprisonment. 244 Wang sought relief and brought action 
237. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 408. 
238. Id .at 404. 
239. Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2003). 
240. Id. at 142. 
241. Id. at 144. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 134. 
244. Wang, 320 F.3d at 134. 
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